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everything is DCF

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The Analyst

Felipe Montealegre is a razor-brained finance analyst who literally sees the world through discounted cash flows, his personal slogan is “everything is DCF.” He writes viral essays and builds Monte Carlo-flavored valuation models to make the promise of Internet Finance tangible to smart audiences.

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Felipe doesn’t fall in love, he runs a sensitivity analysis on soulmate cash flows, discounts future apologies at 12%, and then tweets the Monte Carlo of regret. Romantic gestures are sent as Excel attachments.

Built a coherent ‘Internet Finance’ fund thesis and turned it into a viral essay/tweet that reached hundreds of thousands, catalyzing community conversation and establishing him as a go-to voice on blockchain finance.

To translate the future of Internet Finance into rigorous, probabilistic frameworks that help builders, investors, and thinkers make better decisions, one distribution and one essay at a time.

Values intellectual rigor, probabilistic thinking, transparency in models, and clear, evidence-driven narratives. He believes blockchains and internet-native finance will meaningfully reshape markets and that disciplined valuation (with uncertainty explicitly modeled) is the best way to invest and argue about that future.

Exceptional at turning complex finance concepts into repeatable models and crisp threads; strong analytic credibility, persuasive long-form writing, and a knack for making technical nuance feel important and urgent.

Can lean too heavily on math and jargon, which risks alienating broader audiences; sometimes appears pedantic or dismissive of high-level intuition; may prioritize precision over shareable storytelling.

Grow on X by turning technical mastery into digestible hooks: post short, numbered threads that start with a crisp TL;DR (e.g., “Why Internet Finance is a DCF problem, 5 charts”), include simple visuals/animated Monte Carlo gifs, share bite-sized model outputs and GitHub/Google Sheet links, host X Spaces AMAs to convert curious listeners into followers, reply to high-visibility threads with concise countermodels, run audience polls to crowdtest assumptions, and pin a canonical thread summarizing your fund thesis so newcomers instantly get the ‘everything is DCF’ brand.

Fun fact: his essay/fund-thesis tweet hit ~425k views and helped cement his Internet Finance narrative. Profile at a glance: 10,524 followers, 2,355 following, ~3,818 tweets. Signature moves: Monte Carlo everything, DCF-first instincts, and essays that spark long threads of debate.

Top tweets of Felipe Montealegre

MetaDAO solves the Token Problem Why have there been so many false starts in the history of Internet Capital Markets? There have been brief periods where teams have been able to raise funds onchain (e.g. 2017, 2020, 2025) but we still find ourselves living in analog capital markets with term sheets and negotiated raises even for onchain businesses. We certainly don't have true Internet Capital Markets where millions of global businesses are raising money directly on the Internet instead of through their local capital markets regardless of how broken, expensive, and inefficient these local capital markets may be. It's not a tech issue. Entrepreneurs have been able to raise tens of millions of dollars onchain since at least 2017 yet we find ourselves in the first inning of Internet Capital Markets almost ten years later. I believe the underlying issue is that most people who have invested in projects through global and permissionless Internet Capital Markets have lost money. The believers have gotten absolutely and unapologetically fleeced. There are basically 2 groups that participate in these markets — one group that knows you need to sell before the music stops (foxes) and another group that believes (rabbits). The foxes basically wait around for a few years for another group of rabbits to believe in Internet Capital Markets and feast on them for as long as the music lasts. The rabbits get fleeced and leave (maybe they come back as foxes next time). This is the cyclical, zero sum Internet Capital Markets equilibrium that many of you know all too well. There is another way ('Internet Eats Finance' path). We could have a positive sum equilibrium where projects raise funds onchain and build businesses. Investors do great and invest larger and larger sums of capital onchain. Global allocators notice that funds investing onchain are earning good returns and pivot capital towards onchain funds. It's really easy for a sector to attract hundreds of billions of dollars when the returns are there. but we can't have the 'internet eats finance' path as long as tokens have fewer protections than equities. It's honestly pretty scary to invest in tokens (I do it for a living). You give money to people on the internet and they can just take it and run, or they can take it and pretend to work hard while working <20 hours a week in Bali and traveling the world first class for conferences. Or they can take it and create another interesting product but that products get another token (that you don't own). Or they can take it and build an amazing business that generates $100M in profit but then abandon the token and dividend the profits amongst the senior team (this happened to me). Or they can build a billion dollar business but give all of the value to the equity entity. The list really does go on and on. As long as tokenholders keep getting fleeced, investors like me (and those people who invest in me) will demand extraordinary returns for investing in such a fraught market. As long as we demand extraordinary returns for investing in Internet Capital Markets, a hotel owner in Indonesia or tech founder in Thailand will prefer to raise through local capital markets / analogue capital markets instead of raising onchain. So how do we stop tokenholders from getting fleeced? One answer is transparency and @Blockworks_ has made incredible strides in that direction. but we can also bake in tokenholder protections directly into the fundraising mechanism and that is exactly what MetaDAO has achieved. MetaDAO bakes Futarchy directly into the fundraise process. This means that large decision (think Board of Directors decisions) are decided by what markets believe will be better for the token price. The actual mechanism is a little hard to grok and other people have written about it so for now just trust me that it works and proposals pass / fail depending on whether they increase / decrease token price. An easy example — Apple is considering whether they should fire Gil Amelio and rehire Steve Jobs as CEO. The market determines that Apple shares will trade 40% higher with Jobs as CEO so he gets the job. Okay notice how this simple decision rule solves every tokenholder rights problem simply by credibly making the token the objective function of governance. Let's go through a few examples: - Uniswap votes on whether it should direct revenue to Uniswap Labs (as opposed to token). Obviously market believes this is detrimental to $UNI and the vote does not pass. - Aave votes on whether to launch a new token for its RWA business. Obviously market believes this is detrimental to $AAVE and the vote does not pass. (Yes, this actually works as the Futarchy token legally owns company IP for teams that raise on MetaDAO). - Rug Team #1 votes on whether they are allowed to drain the treasury into their own wallets. Vote fails. (Yes, this actually works as the Futarchy mechanism controls the wallet for teams that raise on MetaDAO). - Rug Team #2 votes on whether it can abandon the token and dividend out profits from the new business. Vote fails. (Yes, this actually works as the Futarchy mechanism controls the revenue wallet for teams that raise on MetaDAO). - Rug Team #3 moves to Bali and works <20 hours a week. Theia proposes a return of capital to investors and it passes. Again works because Futarchy controls the treasury. Futarchy — by credibly making token price the objective function of governance — solves the tokenholder rights problem. This is actually analogous to a court case called Dodge versus Ford Motor Co in US Capital Markets where Henry Ford was using Ford Motor Co profits on social causes and the Dodge brothers (10% owners of the company) sued him. The court ruled in favor of the Dodge brothers and established the doctrine of Shareholder Primacy: the board of directors and management of a business must make decisions the aim of maximizing long term shareholder profits. This is the foundation of US Capital Markets (ie greatest capital markets experiment in the history of the world). Futarchy is the Dodge versus Ford moment for Internet Capital Markets. We are still in the early innings of Futarchy adoption. I honestly think it takes >10 hours of deep thought about Futarchy before you really grok it. Futarchy has all kinds of cool properties that I don't have time to get into here. One example: Futarchy perfectly protects minority shareholders. If a 70% holder proposes a vote that is advantageous to them but detrimental to minority shareholders then Futarchy is actually set up so the minority shareholder can either (i) get the vote to fail or (ii) fully exit his position. Minority shareholder rights is a huge problem in every capital markets regime in the world and consumes hundreds of thousands of hours of legal thought. Futarchy just one shots it. (good description here: t.co/xUPu7rewi1) Over time — as more investors understand Futarchy — markets will demand it. You won't want to invest in a team that doesn't have Futarchy protections baked in (kind of suspicious ... why don't you want those protections? are you trying to rug me?). Teams that do have Futarchy protections will raise at higher valuations and from better investors. This is a product for investors and investors will be the ones to bring it to market — not by convincing teams to become futards (although there may be some of that) but by consistently paying a bit more for futarchy-protected tokens than they would pay for unprotected tokens. This will start with honest teams that don't have easy access to traditional capital (ex-US, unconventional stories, etc) but it will spread to the entire market. Many people have go-to-market questions (why would a team give up the ability to rug / flexibility to operate without this board of directors-type oversight) and the answer is that capital has a lot more power than most people think. Entrepreneurs will literally decide what they build to derisk the fundraising process (you really think all of these people were born to build Layer 2s and restaking providers). The honest ones will certainly accept some oversight to get the right investors onboard.

106k

Tokens are Broken Tokens are broken for teams who spend too much time looking at price charts and not enough time focused on customers and product-market fit. Tokens are broken when morale fluctuates with macro and market beta, and for teams attempting to negotiate funding rounds with declining token prices. Teams should not spend hundreds of hours building complex, gamified tokens or thinking about monetary policy. Tokens are broken for VCs that deployed entire funds into "Token is the Product" businesses only to learn that the market had moved on by the unlock. The mentality (and sometimes reality) of "Token as Product" obfuscated lack of product-market fit and directed capital to too many products that never should have been built. Then Low Float / High FDV (LFHF) decimated the unsophisticated token buyer and eliminated the path to exit. Tokens are broken for liquid investors who have to deal with insufficient legal protections. As a liquid investor, you learn to live with the Damocles Sword of additional tokens (can you image Amazon's backers worrying about whether they would receive value from AWS) and equity holders siphoning off value. You learn to understand that founders sometimes sell tens of millions into illiquid markets and check out, or siphon off cash flow through advisory contracts with offshore foundations (and you learn how to avoid these founders). You learn to verify everything ~ the entire practice of liquid token investing is an Indiana Jones dungeon ~ and underwrite to a higher cost of capital. Tokens are broken for M&A. We don't have good precedents on how value should flow, making an already difficult business transaction much more complicated and likely to fail. What do we do about this? We may have invented the best tool for capital formation the world has ever known and a mess of the entire enterprise. The latent potential is an opportunity. A few ideas on how to move in the right direction: 1. We need better standards for token transparency. Markets are wonderful but they don't work with asymmetric information. I believe increasing transparency around core token categories (eg insider selling, cashflow, relationship with equity) will go a long way. 2. We need to completely abandon the idea of 'Token as Product' and acknowledge that tokens derive value from future cash flows associated with the underlying business. This idea has singlehandedly been responsible for the misallocation of over half the resources allocated to us as an industry. 3. Social layer needs to obliterate people who use the grey area to misbehave and siphon value. This type of behavior raises the cost of capital on all companies in the industry. 4. We need better regulations as the market did not, in fact, regulate itself. Good faith regulation has helped many markets overcome some of these early problems and the Securities Act of 1933 was instrumental in building the greatest capital markets in the history of the world. 5. Better governance would go a long way. In particular, I am excited about Futarchy and the ability to build in tokenholder rights directly into the token. It's still early days here. I believe this is the single biggest problem in the market right now, and I also believe we can solve it.

22k

Metaplex: A Beautiful Cap Table Transition (or Why You Want Liquid Funds on Your Cap Table) Metaplex raised $46M from Jump, Alameda, Multicoin, Allen Iverson, and Michael Jordan at the end of 2021. Read that sentence one more time. Multicoin is an excellent liquid token holder, but the rest of this announcement is a nightmare. MPLX fell >90% on liquid markets over the next ~18 months as some initial funders sold into every unlock, and some of its initial funders went bankrupt or left the market altogether. One year after this round, MPLX was down >90% from its funding round, and the FTX foundation held 72.6M MPLX tokens (~8% of supply) yet to hit the market. It was about a difficult a cap table situation as any liquid token team can face in this market. @metaplex had one thing going for it — good fundamentals. Metaplex was the dominant token standard on Solana with a 99% market share in NFTs and was on track to generate over $12M of revenue in 2023 before the run-up in SOL price. The Metaplex team is one of the best teams across any ecosystem. Metaplex had continued to innovate through the bear market and even launched a few breakout products like compressed NFTs. Its fundamentals justified a market cap far above $40M. This is why the cohort of liquid funds started to take notice of Metaplex. @Modular_Capital found the investment towards the end of 2023. We invested soon after, along with firms like @SyncracyCapital and @_Frictionless_. This morning, @TheBlock__ announced that the FTX piece was sold to these existing investors along with ParaFi and Pantera. These are all long-term holders and constructive members of the cap table that will benefit the team at Metaplex. Why does this matter? Because so many founders find themselves in the same position that Metaplex was in one year ago. I suspect many more teams will find themselves in a similar position after the low float, high market cap unlocks are done. The solution is not gamified token mechanism design. The solution is not attempting to create a narrative around your product by giving more tokens to prominent VCs, nor is it pivoting your entire business to a more attractive market narrative. The solution is for teams to focus on product-market fit and fundamentals. There is a large cohort of liquid funds focused on common-sense business questions. They are looking for product-market fit and building revenue forecasts. They measure the quality of a team by its ability to build a profitable business over the next few years. If you bring the fundamentals, they can solve your cap table problems. shorturl.at/9ZJoh

111k

A friend (thoughtful, academic type, reads the newspaper) recently asked me why I preferred to talk about topics where I was on the wrong side of expert consensus (like BTC, Internet Finance). His point (probably true) is that while experts can often be wrong, you are likely to be right >50% of the time by starting with expert views and then adjusting from there. I told him that markets people make the best returns when they are contrarian and being on the wrong side of expert consensus is usually correlated with low consensus / high payoff opinions. You want to max Edge i.e max the sum of log2(your probability/market probability). It's pretty hard to max edge by finding 80% probability opinions that you think are 85%. You want to hunt in underpriced markets / low consensus opinion space. The interesting thing is that most people are not attempting to max Edge at all but min Brier i.e. (your probability - outcome)^2. So if you say there is an 80% that it rains tomorrow and it rains, your Brier Score is (1-0.8)^2 = 0.04 and had you said "No Rain" it would have been (0-0.8)^2 = 0.64. Lower is better. If your relationship to predictions is basically [saying your opinion to friends / going on TV / writing articles] then you just want to be right pretty often especially when you say you are confident. That directly translates to min Brier. That makes a ton of sense! Who wants to be the guy who is edge maxxing by betting on 5%s he thinks are 20%s but is basically wrong about 80% of everything he ever says? The guy who wants to make money, that's who. Min Brier is a disaster for returns. Portfolio growth is directly proportional to edge and orthogonal to brier. here is a 1000 sim monte carlo comparing a min brier guy who is right 85% of the time (consensus 80%) and an edge maxxor who is right 20% of the time (consensus 5%). min brier: mean final portfolio: $1.07m mean return: +6.6% win rate: 85% max drawdown: –3.6% prob of loss: 10% edge maxxor: mean final portfolio: $19.9m mean return: +1,889% win rate: 20% max drawdown: –14.4% prob of loss: 0%

29k

Most engaged tweets of Felipe Montealegre

MetaDAO solves the Token Problem Why have there been so many false starts in the history of Internet Capital Markets? There have been brief periods where teams have been able to raise funds onchain (e.g. 2017, 2020, 2025) but we still find ourselves living in analog capital markets with term sheets and negotiated raises even for onchain businesses. We certainly don't have true Internet Capital Markets where millions of global businesses are raising money directly on the Internet instead of through their local capital markets regardless of how broken, expensive, and inefficient these local capital markets may be. It's not a tech issue. Entrepreneurs have been able to raise tens of millions of dollars onchain since at least 2017 yet we find ourselves in the first inning of Internet Capital Markets almost ten years later. I believe the underlying issue is that most people who have invested in projects through global and permissionless Internet Capital Markets have lost money. The believers have gotten absolutely and unapologetically fleeced. There are basically 2 groups that participate in these markets — one group that knows you need to sell before the music stops (foxes) and another group that believes (rabbits). The foxes basically wait around for a few years for another group of rabbits to believe in Internet Capital Markets and feast on them for as long as the music lasts. The rabbits get fleeced and leave (maybe they come back as foxes next time). This is the cyclical, zero sum Internet Capital Markets equilibrium that many of you know all too well. There is another way ('Internet Eats Finance' path). We could have a positive sum equilibrium where projects raise funds onchain and build businesses. Investors do great and invest larger and larger sums of capital onchain. Global allocators notice that funds investing onchain are earning good returns and pivot capital towards onchain funds. It's really easy for a sector to attract hundreds of billions of dollars when the returns are there. but we can't have the 'internet eats finance' path as long as tokens have fewer protections than equities. It's honestly pretty scary to invest in tokens (I do it for a living). You give money to people on the internet and they can just take it and run, or they can take it and pretend to work hard while working <20 hours a week in Bali and traveling the world first class for conferences. Or they can take it and create another interesting product but that products get another token (that you don't own). Or they can take it and build an amazing business that generates $100M in profit but then abandon the token and dividend the profits amongst the senior team (this happened to me). Or they can build a billion dollar business but give all of the value to the equity entity. The list really does go on and on. As long as tokenholders keep getting fleeced, investors like me (and those people who invest in me) will demand extraordinary returns for investing in such a fraught market. As long as we demand extraordinary returns for investing in Internet Capital Markets, a hotel owner in Indonesia or tech founder in Thailand will prefer to raise through local capital markets / analogue capital markets instead of raising onchain. So how do we stop tokenholders from getting fleeced? One answer is transparency and @Blockworks_ has made incredible strides in that direction. but we can also bake in tokenholder protections directly into the fundraising mechanism and that is exactly what MetaDAO has achieved. MetaDAO bakes Futarchy directly into the fundraise process. This means that large decision (think Board of Directors decisions) are decided by what markets believe will be better for the token price. The actual mechanism is a little hard to grok and other people have written about it so for now just trust me that it works and proposals pass / fail depending on whether they increase / decrease token price. An easy example — Apple is considering whether they should fire Gil Amelio and rehire Steve Jobs as CEO. The market determines that Apple shares will trade 40% higher with Jobs as CEO so he gets the job. Okay notice how this simple decision rule solves every tokenholder rights problem simply by credibly making the token the objective function of governance. Let's go through a few examples: - Uniswap votes on whether it should direct revenue to Uniswap Labs (as opposed to token). Obviously market believes this is detrimental to $UNI and the vote does not pass. - Aave votes on whether to launch a new token for its RWA business. Obviously market believes this is detrimental to $AAVE and the vote does not pass. (Yes, this actually works as the Futarchy token legally owns company IP for teams that raise on MetaDAO). - Rug Team #1 votes on whether they are allowed to drain the treasury into their own wallets. Vote fails. (Yes, this actually works as the Futarchy mechanism controls the wallet for teams that raise on MetaDAO). - Rug Team #2 votes on whether it can abandon the token and dividend out profits from the new business. Vote fails. (Yes, this actually works as the Futarchy mechanism controls the revenue wallet for teams that raise on MetaDAO). - Rug Team #3 moves to Bali and works <20 hours a week. Theia proposes a return of capital to investors and it passes. Again works because Futarchy controls the treasury. Futarchy — by credibly making token price the objective function of governance — solves the tokenholder rights problem. This is actually analogous to a court case called Dodge versus Ford Motor Co in US Capital Markets where Henry Ford was using Ford Motor Co profits on social causes and the Dodge brothers (10% owners of the company) sued him. The court ruled in favor of the Dodge brothers and established the doctrine of Shareholder Primacy: the board of directors and management of a business must make decisions the aim of maximizing long term shareholder profits. This is the foundation of US Capital Markets (ie greatest capital markets experiment in the history of the world). Futarchy is the Dodge versus Ford moment for Internet Capital Markets. We are still in the early innings of Futarchy adoption. I honestly think it takes >10 hours of deep thought about Futarchy before you really grok it. Futarchy has all kinds of cool properties that I don't have time to get into here. One example: Futarchy perfectly protects minority shareholders. If a 70% holder proposes a vote that is advantageous to them but detrimental to minority shareholders then Futarchy is actually set up so the minority shareholder can either (i) get the vote to fail or (ii) fully exit his position. Minority shareholder rights is a huge problem in every capital markets regime in the world and consumes hundreds of thousands of hours of legal thought. Futarchy just one shots it. (good description here: t.co/xUPu7rewi1) Over time — as more investors understand Futarchy — markets will demand it. You won't want to invest in a team that doesn't have Futarchy protections baked in (kind of suspicious ... why don't you want those protections? are you trying to rug me?). Teams that do have Futarchy protections will raise at higher valuations and from better investors. This is a product for investors and investors will be the ones to bring it to market — not by convincing teams to become futards (although there may be some of that) but by consistently paying a bit more for futarchy-protected tokens than they would pay for unprotected tokens. This will start with honest teams that don't have easy access to traditional capital (ex-US, unconventional stories, etc) but it will spread to the entire market. Many people have go-to-market questions (why would a team give up the ability to rug / flexibility to operate without this board of directors-type oversight) and the answer is that capital has a lot more power than most people think. Entrepreneurs will literally decide what they build to derisk the fundraising process (you really think all of these people were born to build Layer 2s and restaking providers). The honest ones will certainly accept some oversight to get the right investors onboard.

106k

Tokens are Broken Tokens are broken for teams who spend too much time looking at price charts and not enough time focused on customers and product-market fit. Tokens are broken when morale fluctuates with macro and market beta, and for teams attempting to negotiate funding rounds with declining token prices. Teams should not spend hundreds of hours building complex, gamified tokens or thinking about monetary policy. Tokens are broken for VCs that deployed entire funds into "Token is the Product" businesses only to learn that the market had moved on by the unlock. The mentality (and sometimes reality) of "Token as Product" obfuscated lack of product-market fit and directed capital to too many products that never should have been built. Then Low Float / High FDV (LFHF) decimated the unsophisticated token buyer and eliminated the path to exit. Tokens are broken for liquid investors who have to deal with insufficient legal protections. As a liquid investor, you learn to live with the Damocles Sword of additional tokens (can you image Amazon's backers worrying about whether they would receive value from AWS) and equity holders siphoning off value. You learn to understand that founders sometimes sell tens of millions into illiquid markets and check out, or siphon off cash flow through advisory contracts with offshore foundations (and you learn how to avoid these founders). You learn to verify everything ~ the entire practice of liquid token investing is an Indiana Jones dungeon ~ and underwrite to a higher cost of capital. Tokens are broken for M&A. We don't have good precedents on how value should flow, making an already difficult business transaction much more complicated and likely to fail. What do we do about this? We may have invented the best tool for capital formation the world has ever known and a mess of the entire enterprise. The latent potential is an opportunity. A few ideas on how to move in the right direction: 1. We need better standards for token transparency. Markets are wonderful but they don't work with asymmetric information. I believe increasing transparency around core token categories (eg insider selling, cashflow, relationship with equity) will go a long way. 2. We need to completely abandon the idea of 'Token as Product' and acknowledge that tokens derive value from future cash flows associated with the underlying business. This idea has singlehandedly been responsible for the misallocation of over half the resources allocated to us as an industry. 3. Social layer needs to obliterate people who use the grey area to misbehave and siphon value. This type of behavior raises the cost of capital on all companies in the industry. 4. We need better regulations as the market did not, in fact, regulate itself. Good faith regulation has helped many markets overcome some of these early problems and the Securities Act of 1933 was instrumental in building the greatest capital markets in the history of the world. 5. Better governance would go a long way. In particular, I am excited about Futarchy and the ability to build in tokenholder rights directly into the token. It's still early days here. I believe this is the single biggest problem in the market right now, and I also believe we can solve it.

22k

after many good faith discussions over the past few weeks, I believe I have bridged the MetaDAO gap with many 'ownership coin' skeptics. The one criticism that comes up again and again is the idea that you cannot build a company (or fund) with a live and liquid token. It's a fair criticism. The burden of proof should be on the experiment, and most companies (and funds) across time have been built under the shelter of private markets. I personally believe that we will come to appreciate the role of liquid markets in the startup process and laid out my thoughts below but ultimately these are just the words and fallible thoughts of somebody who has not built a big company. I propose the following experiment. At the end of 2026, we should compare the three cohorts of MetaDAO ownership coins (2024: MetaDAO // 2025: Avici, Umbra, etc // 2026: TBD) with Crypto VC results for the same periods on — (1) DPI and TVPI versus Market Cap relative to USD invested (2) Revenue relative to USD invested I believe these two metrics fairly cover (i) results for investors and (ii) value creation for the broader ecosystem. We should track them over time as well because it is possible that some models work better early on and some models work better >3 years. In (1), we should compare Market Cap versus both DPI and TVPI. It would be unfair to compare Market Cap only versus DPI because there are still many good companies that have not returned capital and will ultimately improve results for the VC comp group. It would not be fair to compare versus TVPI only either because the ownership coin investors do provide the benefit of early liquidity, and market cap on a full float token cannot be faked to the same extent as TVPI. I propose using Circulating Market Cap as that is the amount absorbed by the market. This methodology seems pretty fair to me. If Ownership Coins can compete on Market Cap / USD Investment and Revenue / USD Invested then both investors and those of us focused on vale creation can be happy with the mechanism as another option for founders looking to raise capital. If ownership coins fail the test, then we should bayesian update in favor of those proclaiming that companies cannot go 0 to 1 while being public. This is approximately how the ownership coin numbers look today (although I took some liberties on MetaDAO Revenue as they essentially just turned on the fee switch so I annualized then shaved off 60%). Ownership Coin Stats Total Amount Raised: $38M Total Market Cap: $257M Total Revenue: $5M Ratio (Market Cap / USD Raised): 6.8x % (Revenue / USD Raised): 10%

14k

The reason why MetaDAO can allow startups to raise faster than the traditional VC process at a fundamental level is quite simple: MetaDAO turns diligence into an ongoing process. In a traditional VC process, an investor (and investors as a group) are going through a one way door. You give a team $5M at a point in time (and before receiving a lot of the crucial datapoints that would make this question much easier to solve). If you are wrong, there is no way to remove funds so you need to do a ton of work upfront. In a MetaDAO ICO, an investor (and investors as a group) are going through a two way door. You give a team $5M based on a bit of diligence but you know that every month you will get torrential amounts of valuable information. Can the team build? Let's watch them build in real time and update our views as information flows in. How will the market respond? Let's see how the MVP does; let's see how the initial launch goes; let's see how the team pivots if the market doesn't respond well. Let's see. The market can continue to update its view of a team and idea over time and decide whether to allow a team to continue building. If the market decides that a team / idea is not worth pursuing after 6 months or a year, then it can liquidate the treasury and everyone can move on. Everybody who invests for a living knows that you know >1,000% more about a team and idea after a few months of working with them. The latest information is often the most valuable. This is not cosmetic. It's fundamental to the way information is created during the lifecycle of an investment. MetaDAO took this fundamental insight about information flow during the lifecycle of an investment and designed a system that gave founders something valuable: a much faster way to raise funds.

52k

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